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1 Introduction
In a recent survey paper, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) note that trade
economists have moved away from studying the impact of trade policy. They
point out that this may partly reflect a belief that trade policy no longer mat-
ters, since by and large it has become so liberal.1 But Pavcnik and Goldberg
also note that studies estimating the impact of trade policies in the 1970s
and 1980s, when these were not so uniformly liberal, suggest that they had
no big eﬀect then either. Does trade policy matter, they ask. Did it ever
matter?2
If trade policy ever mattered, it surely did so during the interwar period.
However, despite the ferocious reputation of interventions such as the United
States’ Smoot-Hawley tariﬀ, the academic literature of the past twenty-five
years has tended to downplay the impact of both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers
to trade during the 1930s as well. Perhaps it is not so surprising that protec-
tion has emerged as a relatively minor contributor to the world trade collapse
of 1929-33: world income and output fell by so much during this period that
it can plausibly account for the majority of declining trade, leaving relatively
little for rising trade barriers to explain.3
But the quantitative literature has also tended to downplay the impact
of trade policy on a second striking feature of world trade during this period:
its decreasingly multilateral nature. Table 1 gives the League of Nation’s
well-known data on the share of empires, or informal spheres of influence,
1However, Bown and Crowley (2016) argue that substantial trade barriers in fact remain
in place today.
2Goldberg and Pavcnik also suggest that economists may be reluctant to study the
impact of trade policy because of endogeneity concerns regarding studies which relate
bilateral aggregate trade flows to countries’ membership, or otherwise, of the GATT or
WTO – of which more later.
3See for example Irwin (1998). Irwin (2012) provides an excellent survey of the liter-
ature, and makes a spirited case for the importance of trade policy during the period. A
companion paper to this one, focusing on the collapse in British trade during this period,
will discuss this literature in detail.
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Table 1: Share of formal and informal empire in trade, 1929-38
Trade of Share of
In imports In exports
1929 1932 1938 1929 1932 1938
United Kingdom British
Commonwealth,
colonies,
protectorates, etc.
30.2 36.4 41.9 44.4 45.4 49.9
United States Phillippines 2.9 6.1 4.8 1.6 2.8 2.8
France French colonies,
protectorates and
mandated territories
12 20.9 25.8 18.8 31.5 27.5
Belgium Belgian Congo 3.9 3.8 8.3 2.6 1.3 1.9
Netherlands Netherlands overseas
territories
5.5 5 8.8 9.4 5.9 10.7
Italy Italian colonies and
Ethiopia
1.5 1.1 1.8 2.1 3.6 23.3
Portugal Portuguese overseas
territories
7.9 10.4 10.2 12.7 13.9 12.2
Japan
Korea and Formosa 12.3 26.2 30 16.8 21.6 32.9
Kwantung 6 4 1.6 4.8 6.8 13.7
Manchuria 1.9 2.7 9 2.5 1.5 8.1
Rest of China 5.8 4 4.4 10.9 7.3 8
Total Japanese sphere
of influence
26 36.9 45 35 37.2 62.7
Germany
Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary, Romania,
Turkey, Yugoslavia
4.5 5.5 12 5 3.9 13.2
Latin America 12.2 11.2 15.6 7.8 4.3 11.5
Total German sphere
of influence
16.7 16.7 27.6 12.8 8.2 24.7
Source: League of Nations (1939, pp. 34-5)
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in the trade of several leading countries between 1929 and 1938. As can be
seen, these shares increased systematically in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion. Figure 1 shows the British Empire’s share of UK imports between 1924
and 1938: the increase after 1931 is striking.4 In the aftermath of World
War II, policy-makers looking back at the period saw this tendency towards
decreasing multilateralism as having been one of the most harmful features
of the interwar economy, both economically and politically. Surely the trade
policies of actual and aspirant empires had something to do with this shift
in trade patterns?
In an early econometric contribution, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) es-
timate cross-sectional gravity equations for 1928, 1935 and 1938, using ag-
gregate trade data for 34 countries (and 561 bilateral flows). While they
find that pairs of countries that both belonged to the British Commonwealth
traded more heavily with each other, this eﬀect was already present in 1928,
before Britain moved to protection, and before the Ottawa agreements set
in place preferential trade policies within the Empire (see Section 2 below).
The coeﬃcient on bilateral Commonwealth membership was higher in the
1930s than in 1928, but not greatly so: Eichengreen and Irwin conclude that
“the tendency toward regionalization commonly ascribed to the formation
of trade and currency blocs was already evident prior to the regional policy
initiatives of the 1930s; to a considerable extent it is attributable to ongoing
historical forces such as commercial and financial linkages between countries
forged over many years. While there is some evidence that the formation of
trade blocs diverted transactions toward fellow bloc members at the expense
of trade with the rest of the world, this was only one of several factors at
work” (p. 21).
Subsequent literature has largely reinforced this view. Wolf and Ritschl
(2011) emphasise the fact that trade blocs, as well as the currency blocs
4Ignore the series labelled “sample” for now. This refers to the Empire’s share of UK
imports in our data sample.
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Figure 1: Share of British Empire in total UK imports, 1924-1938
Source: Statistical Oﬃce, H.M. Customs and Excise Department (1929; 1935;
1939).
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that are the major focus of their paper, are endogenous; controlling for a
bloc fixed eﬀect, they find that the formation of the Ottawa trade bloc had
no additional impact on trade flows between members.5 Gowa and Hicks
(2013), who use a much larger dataset on aggregate trade flows than the
previous two studies, also conclude that “blocs made much less diﬀerence
to trade than commonly assumed...None of them raised trade between their
members as a whole...Nor do we find any evidence of the infamous beggar-
thy-neighbor eﬀects long attributed to them— that is, none diverted trade to
member states from nonmembers” (p. 440). Gowa and Hicks do find that the
British Imperial Preference System is a partial exception to this general rule,
in that while it had no impact on trade between British Dominions, it did
increase trade between the UK and the Dominions. (However, their analysis
is potentially subject to the aforementioned objection that bloc membership
was not randomly assigned across countries.) Surveying the literature, Irwin
(2012, p. 141) concludes that “while discriminatory policies succeeded in
shifting the pattern of trade, they may have been less important than might
appear to be the case from table 3.2” (his version of Table 1).
In this paper we revisit the question of whether trade policy was responsi-
ble for the shift towards intra-Imperial trade, but adopt an entirely diﬀerent
empirical approach in tackling the issue. Rather than looking at the rela-
tionship between aggregate bilateral trade on the one hand, and country-pair
bloc membership on the other, we study the actual (and discriminatory) trade
policies pursued by one country, the United Kingom, in great detail. Rather
than looking at whether trade blocs existed or not, we look at what one key
member of one trade bloc actually did, and at what the eﬀects of its poli-
cies were. Furthermore, since so much interwar protectionism consisted of
non-tariﬀ barriers to trade, aﬀecting imports of particular commodities, and
since tariﬀ rates diﬀered greatly across commodities, we use disaggregated,
commodity-specific data on both trade and trade policies.
5They use the same aggregate trade data as Eichengreen and Irwin (1995).
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We therefore collected and digitized data on imports into the UK of 847
products from 42 countries between 1924 and 1938. These were then ag-
gregated up, allowing us to construct an import database for 258 product
categories that are consistently defined over time. We also collected bilat-
eral, commodity and country-specific data on tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers
to trade for the same countries, products and years. The result is a dataset
with 162,540 potential observations, although the value of many of these is of
course zero. Because trade policies varied by commodity, year, and country,
we can calculate elasticities of trade with respect to tariﬀs including both
country times commodity, and commodity times year, fixed eﬀects in the
econometric specification.
Armed with these elasticities, we can then calculate a variety of coun-
terfactual “free trade” or “constant policy” equilibria for individual years in
the 1930s, which can be compared with the actual trade data. The model
we use to calculate these counterfactual equilibria is straightforward: on the
demand side we assume nested utility functions as in Broda and Weinstein
(2006), while on the supply side a single production sector transforms the
sole factor of production into domestically consumed output and exports via
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) production function.6 In this
manner we obtain estimates of the impact of protection on the share of the
British Empire in the UK’s imports.
We find that more than half of the increase in the Empire’s share of UK
imports can be attributed to trade policy. Policy accounted for almost 70%
of the increase between 1930 and 1933. Our results are a vindication of tradi-
tional historical accounts, which argue that the increasingly bilateral nature
of interwar trade was largely due to the policies pursued by governments.
6The model is thus similar to that used by Anderson and Neary (1996) to calculate
their Trade Restrictiveness Index, and like theirs it can be calibrated using information
on just GDP and imports. It is simpler in that it only includes one, domestic input into
production; it is more complicated in that there is a three tier nesting structure on the
demand side, to take account of the fact that trade policies varied not only by good but
also by country.
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Whatever about the impact of trade policies on trade flows today, British
trade policy mattered, a lot, during the 1930s.
Section 2 describes the dramatic shift in British trade policy which oc-
curred between 1931 and 1933. The subseqent section describes the dataset
which will be used to analyse the consequences of this shift. We will do so
using the fairly standard theoretical framework described in Section 4, while
Section 5 derives the key trade elasticities embedded in our model. Section 6
estimates the impact of British trade policies on the composition of British
imports, and Section 7 concludes.
2 British interwar trade policy
Britain’s long-standing free trade policy was abandoned during World War I.
More importantly for our purposes, free trade did not resume in 1918. The
1915 McKenna Duty imposed a 331/3 % ad valorem tariﬀ on cars, clocks and
watches, films and musical instruments, and was retained after the war. The
1920 Dyestuﬀs Industry Act required dyestuﬀs to be imported under license
(National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1943, 2-3). The 1921
Safeguarding of Industries Act introduced not only anti-dumping duties but
tariﬀs, again usually 331/3 % ad valorem, on imports of “key” goods consid-
ered to be essential for national security (including some chemicals, optical
glass, magnets and tungsten) (Gordon, 1941, 10, 216-7). The Act also al-
lowed industries to apply to the Board of Trade for “safeguarding” protection,
although there were strict conditions attached and few industries benefitted
from this provision. Post-war revenue duties were modestly protective in the
cases of artificial silk, petrol and sugar. In 1925 a new set of duties for rev-
enue purposes was introduced on (raw) silk, artificial silk and articles made
thereof. In 1928 a new duty on imported hydrocarbon oils (crude and refined
petroleum) was introduced, again for revenue purposes. This was initially
levied on light oils only, but was subsequently extended to include heavy oils
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as well (National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1943, pp. 17-8).
In 1926 pork imports from the European Continent were embargoed on vet-
erinary grounds (Ashby and Jones, 1938b, p. 225). The 1927 Cinematograph
Films Act included minimum quotas for British (or British Empire) films.7
There was a modest degree of Imperial Preference during this period: rev-
enue duties were one sixth lower on goods produced in the Empire, McKenna
duties were one third lower, “key” goods from the Empire were exempt from
the 1921 duties, and safeguarding duties were also lower on Imperial prod-
ucts (Richardson 1936, pp. 88-90; National Institute of Economic and Social
Research 1943, p. 3).
Notwithstanding these departures from 19th century practice, British
trade policy remained predominantly liberal until 1930. The change that
occurred in 1931 and 1932 was therefore all the more dramatic. In November
1931 the Abnormal Importations Act allowed the Board of Trade to impose
tariﬀs of up to 100% ad valorem on manufactured goods from outside the
Empire, and tariﬀs of 50% were immediately imposed on many of these. The
Horticultural Products (Emergency Duties) Act soon followed, allowing the
Minister of Agriculture to impose similar duties on non-Empire fruit, flowers
and vegetables.
In February 1932 an Import Duties Act imposed a general 10% tariﬀ on
goods not already subject to duties, though some important primary imports
were exempted. These included not only raw materials such as raw cotton,
raw wool, hides and skins, iron ore, and scrap iron, but also tea, animals,
and foodstuﬀs such as meat and wheat that would later become important
in the Ottawa negotiations (Gordon, 1941, p. 219). Goods from British
colonies were exempted, while imports from the self-governing Dominions
were temporarily exempted pending the outcome of the Ottawa conference
due to begin in July. The 10% general tariﬀ was a minimum tariﬀ, in the
sense that a new Import Duties Advisory Committee could impose additional
7Plant et al. (1939, p. II-41); Miskell (2005).
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duties.8 They did so beginning in April and continued to do so subsequently,
with Imperial goods generally being exempted.
The Ottawa conference opened on the 21st of July, and negotiations con-
tinued for roughly a month. Britain sought improved access in Dominion
markets, while the Dominions sought preferential access to the UK market.
As long as the UK maintained a free trade policy this had been impossible;
however, as we have seen, the Import Duties Act had established Imperial
Preference for those goods protected under its provisions. The Dominions’
aim was thus to secure and if possible to improve their margin of prefer-
ence for goods where preference had already been secured; and to establish
a margin of Imperial Preference in markets for goods, such as meat and
wheat, which were still admitted duty-free into the British market, and were
of particular importance to them. The British, on the other hand, wished
to improve their access to Dominion markets, and to retain a margin for
manoeuvre when it came to potential future trade agreements with foreign
countries.
The outcome was a series of bilateral trade agreements between the par-
ticipants, the UK signing agreements with Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, Newfoundland, India and Southern Rhodesia (British Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1931-32).9 In broad terms, Britain agreed to maintain or
raise tariﬀs imposed on foreign imports under the terms of the 1932 Import
Duties Act, and not to reduce the 10% ad valorem tariﬀ without the consent
of the Dominions; to continue to exempt Empire products from these tariﬀs;
and to introduce or enhance Imperial Preference on a wide range of agricul-
tural commodities and raw materials of special interest to the Dominions,
by raising duties or by protecting goods that had previously been duty free
8The IDAC had to consult with the Board of Trade, and its decisions had to be sanc-
tioned by the Treasury and Parliament (National Institute of Economic and Social Re-
search, 1943, p. 5).
9Good accounts of the Ottawa negotiations and the eventual agreements are to be
found inter alia in Drummond (1974), Gordon (1941, pp. 458-63), Richardson (1936, pp.
138-55), Richardson (1938), and Rooth (1993), on whom this account draws.
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such as wheat (Drummond, 1974, pp. 266-268).
Quotas were introduced for several agricultural commodities, on the basis
that policy needed to serve the interests of “the home producer first, Empire
producers second, and foreign producers last” (Richardson, 1936, p. 138).
Thus, imports from foreign countries of frozen mutton and lamb, and frozen
and chilled beef, were to be subject to quotas from January 1 1933 (with
total quantities reduced by 10% in the first year and 35% from 1934 to 1937,
and then slightly increased), while Australia and New Zealand agreed to
voluntarily restrain their exports to a certain extent.10
A report issued soon after the passage of the 1932 Import Duties Act on
the future of the British pig industry recommended that imports of bacon
and ham also be regulated quantitatively, and quantitative restrictions came
into force during 1932: first via voluntary export restraint agreements with
the eleven major supplying countries, notably Denmark, and from December
1933 onwards via quotas (Carter Murphy, 1957, p. 367; Cohen, 1934, p. 450;
Plant et al., 1939, p. II-44).These restrictions were only enforced for non-
Empire countries, although an agreement with Canada in 1932 had fixed a
limit of 2.5 million cwt per year. This limit never became binding, however,
since Canadian exports to Britain remained below that quantity.11
As the example of the bacon industry shows, domestic policies regulating
individual agricultural industries could restrict trade, although protection
was only adopted in some instances. For example, in May 1932 the Wheat
Act guaranteed minimum prices to British wheat growers, and established
the practice of deficiency payments that would continue into the post-1945
10Both agreed to restrain their 1933 exports of frozen mutton and lamb to the level
prevailing in the previous year, while New Zealand “estimated” that its frozen beef exports
would increase by no more than around 10%. At least in 1934, these voluntary restrictions
seem to have been ineﬀective. Initially not subject to the restrictions, imports of beef
oﬀal soon became subject to the beef quota system, so as to combat evasion of the quotas
(National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1943, pp. 108, 110)
11Due to the Anglo-Irish trade war substantial duties were imposed on Irish bacon
between 1932 and 1938 (National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1943, p. 98).
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period. These were financed by levies on flour sales. The Act is sometimes
described as protectionist (National Institute of Economic and Social Re-
search, 1943, p. 6) and it did protect British wheat farmers by guaranteeing
them higher prices, but it was not protectionist in the sense of restricting
imports (Royal Institute of International Aﬀairs, 1932, p. 189).
There were several other commodity-specific schemes introduced during
the next few years following the introduction of the Agricultural Marketing
Acts of 1931 and 1933.12 The 1933 Act permitted the regulation of imports,
and this was done in some cases (hops, potatoes, cured pork).13 In 1935,
imports of frozen and chilled pork became subject to quantitative controls
under the terms of the Pork (Import Regulation) Order of 1935, based on the
1933 Agricultural Marketing Act (quotas in the case of foreign countries, and
voluntary, if ineﬀective, export restraints in the case of Australia, Canada and
New Zealand).14 Imports of fish became subject to quantitative restrictions
under the terms of the 1933 Sea Fishing Industry Act (Plant et al., 1939, pp.
II-39, 40).
However, quantitative restrictions were not always introduced, despite
New Zealand attempts to have quotas instituted in the cases of cheese and
butter (Wheeler, 1937; Hancock, 1937, pp. 233-4). Under the terms of the
Ottawa Accords Britain retained the right to impose quotas on the importa-
tion of dairy products, eggs and poultry, but in the case of butter and eggs
never exercised this right, implying that Imperial Preference for these goods
was the result of tariﬀs alone (Gøtrik, 1939, p. 47; National Institute of
Economic and Social Research (1943, pp. 113-4)).15 Nonetheless, there was
12There were actually two such acts in 1933, although the second introduced “only minor
modifications” (Cohen, 1934, p. 434).
13On hops and potatoes, which are not in our sample, see National Institute of Economic
and Social Research (1943, pp. 99-105) and Wheeler (1937, p. 265).
14Ashby and Jones (1938b, p. 214); National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(1943, p. 109).
15There were however some “negotiated standstill agreements” regulating the impor-
tation of eggs between 1933 and 1935 (Ashby and Jones, 1938b, p. 208). “Up to 30th
September, 1934, there was a standstill arrangement on the basis of imports during the
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some “voluntary” restriction of dairy products by some exporters “with the
shadow of the 1933 Act behind them” Sorenson and Cassels (1936, p. 277).16
From 1933 onwards there was a series of trade agreements with various
countries, notably the Scandinavian countries and Argentina. These typi-
cally secured trade concessions for Britain in return for her not worsening
the positions of these countries any further in the British market than had
already been done at Ottawa. In most cases agreements also included clauses
regarding specific goods, in order to ensure that Britain would not discrimi-
nate in the future against important treaty partner export commodities. In
most cases, these clauses remained ineﬀective since Britain did not greatly
extend its quota and tariﬀ system after 1932/33. For example, Denmark
was guaranteed a minimum share of British imports of bacon and ham from
foreign countries, but with no guarantee as to how large those foreign im-
ports should be; and it was granted minimum quotas for butter and eggs in
the event that imports of these commodities became subject to quantitative
restriction – which eventuality did not arise, as we have seen. In May 1933
and December 1936 agreements were concluded with Argentina that guaran-
teed that country a minimum quantity and minimum quota of chilled beef
corresponding period of 1933. Subsequent arrangements provided for small reductions of
varying amounts in total imports, but for the last quarter of 1935 there was a reversion
to the standstill arrangement. The requests were not complied with in all cases, and no
request was made to foreign countries after the end of 1935, since by that time the Reor-
ganisation Commissions for Eggs and Poultry had reported and had not recommended the
introduction of a general system of quantitative regulation of imports of eggs.” Statement
by Dr. Burgin, President of the Board of Trade, to the House of Commons, 16 Febru-
ary 1937 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1937/feb/16/eggs-imports, ac-
cessed 25 January 2015).
16The items concerned included condensed milk (whole and skimmed), milk powder
and cream (Ashby and Jones, 1938a, p. 198), on which quotas were fixed based – for
non-Empire countries – on imports between June 1932 and May 1933, stipulating annual
percentage reductions in comparison to the base year. These reductions were initially
between 25 and 40% depending on the product. In 1937 about 50 percent less cream
and condensed milk, and approximately 20 percent less milk powder, was imported from
foreign countries compared to the base year (National Institute of Economic and Social
Research, 1943, p. 85). Special provisions were in force for Ireland from 1933 until the
Irish Agreement of April 1938 gave Irish imports Empire status again (ibid.).
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imports, and a minimum quantity of frozen beef imports (National Institute
of Economic and Social Research, 1943, pp. 73, 107-8, 197-8).
Imports were sometimes blocked for more political reasons. Britain par-
ticipated in the ill-fated League of Nations sanctions campaign against Italy,
as a result of which imports from that country were banned between Novem-
ber 1935 and June 1936 (Ristuccia, 2000). Mention should also be made of
the Anglo-Irish trade war which began in 1932, and which led to the im-
position of emergency duties on imports of Irish agricultural commodities,
notably cattle; duties were reduced in 1934, and the dispute ended in 1938,
on terms highly favourable to the Irish (O’Rourke, 1991).17
3 Data
The basic problem with historical trade data is that the trade classifications
used by the relevant national authorities are consistent neither across coun-
tries, nor over time. However, it is sometimes possible to construct import
17In our econometric specifications we will also control for various cartel agreements that
restricted imports, albeit as a result of private sector rather than government decisions.
For example, a December 1934 agreement between the British and Polish coal industries
established understandings regarding the two countries’ coal exports. In June 1937 an
International Coke Agreement limited coke exports for the main exporting nations (Plant
et al., 1939, p. II-45). The best known of these cartels is the European Steel Cartel, which
British iron and steel manufacturers joined in 1935. This included producers from Belgium,
France, Germany and Luxemburg. As a result of Britain’s joining the cartel iron and steel
imports were limited, although cartel members benefitted in that they did not have to pay
the higher tariﬀs imposed on the exports of non-cartel-members (Richardson, 1938, p. 130;
Benham, 1941, pp. 69-70). Poland joined the cartel at about the same time as Britain,
Czechoslovakia joined in 1936/7, and the US industry reached an agreement with the cartel
in 1938 (Hexner, 1943, pp. 88-9, 207-8). (The Czech industry had earlier (1934) made
agreements with the cartel concerning thick plates, medium plates and universal steel:
ibid. p. 128.) The agreement initially ran from 8 August 1935 to 7 August 1938, and
was eventually extended to 1940. The Import Duties (Iron and Steel) Regulation of 1936
substantiated this lower duty and limited the imports of steel from countries outside the
agreement, especially the United States, to their 1934 level of imports (National Institute
of Economic and Social Research, 1943, pp. 147-9; Benham, 1941, pp. 69-70). Details of
the cartels in operation during this period, of relevance to our sample of commodities, are
given in Appendix 4.
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data that correspond to SITC categories: doing so requires that the trade
categories reported at the time fall entirely within particular SITC categories,
and that the available data allow us to capture all imports falling within a
given SITC category. We collected data on all British imports, between 1924
and 1938, in 38 distinct 3-digit SITC categories.18 These categories were cho-
sen because of their importance in world trade generally, and also because it
was possible to consistently calculate import values for each.19
In order to accomplish this goal we typed into spreadsheets import data
from various volumes of the Annual Statement of Trade of the United King-
dom (Statistical Oﬃce, H.M. Customs and Excise Department 1929; 1935;
1939). For each year we collected import values for 847 individual product
categories from 42 countries. For three of these countries (Spain, Malaysia,
and the Dutch East Indies), we had to type in data for a total of 10 sub-
regions, implying that we entered data for a total of 49 countries or sub-
regions.20 In principle this implied collecting 622,545 datapoints, although
product categories tended to change over time, some vanishing and oth-
ers appearing, implying that the actual number of datapoints collected was
rather smaller. In addition, the value of many observations was zero. We
excluded 34 of these items because of a variety of classification problems,
or because no tariﬀ data were available, or because there were no imports
listed from our 42 country sample (just from “other” countries). This left a
total of 812 products, which we were able to aggregate to produce import
data which are consistently defined over time for 258 product categories. It
is these 258 product categories that can be aggregated up to provide data
18We are using the original Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 1,
based on Statistical Oﬃce of the United Nations (1951; 1953).
19That is, the sub-categories of trade we needed to compute these values fell neatly
within our 3-digit SITC categories, rather than spanning two or more categories; and we
were able to capture all of the imports within each 3-digit category.
20In addition, imports from Burma were shown separately from 1937, and had to be
added to imports from British India so as to produce consistent series. Appendix 2 lists
the countries in our sample.
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for our 38 SITC 3-digit categories. (Full details are provided in Appendix
1.) For example, our good number 232, “Wool. Raw. Sheep’s and lambs’
wool”, was constructed using data for 22 separate items that appear in the
trade statistics between 1924 and 1938. These include “Raw Materials and
Articles Mainly Unmanufactured. Wool, raw, and waste, and woollen rags.
Wool, raw, sheep’s and lambs’ wool, merino, scoured or carbonized; sliped or
pulled”; “Wool, raw, sheep’s and lambs’ wool, merino, greasy”; “Wool, raw,
sheep’s and lambs’ wool, crossbred. Greasy”; “Wool, raw, sheep’s and lambs’
wool, Other Sorts. Greasy”; and “Wool, raw, sheep’s and lambs’ wool, Cross-
bred, Wool in the Fleece. Greasy”. A complicating factor for this good was
the fact that the statistics reported an increasingly detailed disaggregation
over time. Good 232 falls under the 3-digit SITC heading 262 (“Wool and
other animal hair”), as do our goods 222 to 235, which include the hair of
other animals (alpaca, camel, mohair, horse, cow, goat, etc) and wool in dif-
ferent conditions (such as noils, waste, rags, flocks and tops). Thankfully,
there are also series which are presented consistently over time, and for which
there is only one original trade statistics item coresponding to one of our 258
goods.
The products span the entire range of the goods imported by Britain.
In the analysis that follows, we will often distinguish between four broad
categories: agricultural products such as wheat or meat; manufactured goods
such as copper or machinery; raw materials such as coal, fertilizers, raw
cotton or oilseeds; and “exotic” or “colonial” goods, on which revenue tariﬀs
were levied. (Tariﬀs on goods such as tea, coﬀee, sugar and tobacco were
traditionally very high, reflecting highly inelastic demand.)21
As Figure 2 indicates, our sample accounts for a relatively stable percent-
age of total British imports in each year. On average, our 258 commodity
21Raw silk and petroleum were also included in this category, since although they were
raw materials, they became subject to tariﬀs that were much higher than the tariﬀs applied
to raw materials generally, presumably for revenue-raising reasons. Full details of this four-
category classification are provided in Appendix 1.
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Figure 2: Percentage of total imports covered by our sample, 1924-1938
Source: see text.
sample accounts for about 57% of British imports during the period, while
imports of these 258 commodities from our 42 country sample accounts for
roughly 50%. The sample thus mirrors the fall and rise of British imports
in the years after 1929. Table 2 shows that our sample roughly matches the
aggregate data in terms of its percentage breakdown between our four broad
categories (agricultural goods, manufactured goods, raw materials, and rev-
enue imports), although we are under-sampling manufactured imports, and
to a lesser extent raw materials, and over-sampling revenue imports.22 As
Figure 1 shows, our sample faithfully tracks the share of the British Empire
in UK imports over time.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2006), we will refer in what follows to
22This is because imports of manufactures are extremely heterogeneous, and disaggre-
gated into a large number of individual items in the trade statistics. This is also the case
for some raw materials (e.g. there are many varieties of medicinal plants and chemical
substances). On the other hand, revenue goods are rather concentrated.
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Table 2: Percentage of total imports by broad category
Agriculture Manufactures Raw materials Revenue goods
In our sample
1924 35.9 13.6 32.5 18.0
1925 35.9 14.7 33.8 15.6
1926 34.5 14.5 34.6 16.5
1927 37.3 17.1 28.0 17.6
In the oﬃcial trade statistics
1924 35.4 20.6 30.9 13.2
1925 34.6 21.7 31.7 12.0
1926 34.3 21.8 31.2 12.7
1927 34.8 23.5 28.2 13.4
Source: see text.
each of our 258 product categories as a good, and to imports of each of these
goods from a particular country as a variety. Unfortunately, successive vol-
umes of the British trade statistics seem to have diﬀered in the extent to
which they separated out imports of particular goods from marginal suppli-
ers; over time they seem to have increasingly lumped these into the “Other
countries” category. This makes it impossible to replicate Broda and Wein-
stein’s analysis of the evolution of the intensive and extensive margins. The
number of goods imported into the UK diminished over time: from 255-258
in 1924-8, to 247 or 248 in 1929-1932, to 237 or 238 in 1934-38. Again, these
successive declines correspond with successive volumes of the trade statistics.
Nonetheless, it seems that the intensive margin accounted for essentially
all of the trade collapse, and subsequent recovery. For example, take the
volume of trade statistics covering the years 1929-33: within this volume,
the reporting of countries and goods was consistent over time. The number
of varieties imported into the UK was 1338 in 1929, 1354 in 1930, 1339 in
1931, 1319 in 1932 and 1298 in 1933. The total number of varieties imported
thus fell by only 3% between 1929 and 1933.23 More systematically, we can
23In the 1924-28 volume, the number of varieties ranged from 1605 to 1645; in the
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decompose the decline in UK imports between 1929 and 1933 in the manner
of Kehoe and Ruhl (2013, p. 380). When we compute the log change of
the total imports of those varieties which are traded in both years, which we
take to be the intensive margin, and compare this with the log change in the
total value of all imports, we find that the intensive margin can account for
the entire decline in trade. When we repeat the exercise for 1929-36, we find
that the intensive margin can still account for 98.9% of the decline in trade –
despite the classification problems associated with moving across volumes.24
Our modelling strategy will thus focus on the intensive margin.
Tariﬀ information was also reported in the Annual Statement, but in a
diﬀerent table from the trade data, and unfortunately not at as disaggregated
a level as the 847-product import data. Additional information on rates
of duty and exemptions was obtained from schedules included in National
Institute of Economic and Social Research (1943) and H.M. Customs and
Excise (1933, 1938).
Some matching of tariﬀ rates to individual products was required, which
was done at the closest level possible to the import data. For example, tariﬀ
information was given for “Cotton Linters and Cotton Waste”. This rate was
then applied to all individual series covered by this category (e.g. Cotton
Linters, bleached) unless a specific exemption was identified.
To calculate ad valorem tariﬀ rates for each item, two approaches were
implemented. Where possible, the tariﬀ rate was calculated as the total
amount of duty raised, divided by the value25 of non-Empire goods charged
with duty as recorded in the Annual Statement. In the small number of cases
where the rate could not be determined by this method, it was calculated
as the specific duty rate divided by the unit value (import value divided by
import quantity).
Quantitative restrictions, including the veterinary embargos from 1926
1934-38 volume, it ranged from 1107 to 1127.
24Details available on request.
25Or the quantity subject to duty multiplied by the average price.
18
and the ban on imports from Italy in 1935-626, were coded based on National
Institute of Economic and Social Research (1943, pp. 95-114, 267). We
also used this source to code voluntary export restraints, alongside the more
detailed sources given in Section 2 above. In all cases quantitative restrictions
were coded simply as dummy variables, indicating whether or not a particular
restriction aﬀected imports of a particular good from a particular country in
a particular year. Details are given in Appendix 3.
As mentioned in Section 2, Britain signed a number of trade treaties
with countries such as Argentina and Denmark. We therefore coded two
variables relating to these treaties. The first simply indicates whether a trade
treaty had been signed and was in force between the UK and the country
in question in a particular year (it thus varied across countries and years,
but not across commodities). The second indicates whether such a treaty
explicitly mentioned a commodity, imports of which from that country were
subject to British quota restrictions in that year. It therefore varies across
countries, years and commodities, and is designed to test whether treaties
muted the impact of quotas on imports. Full details of these two variables,
and the sources used to code them, are given in Appendix 5.
In our regressions, we also controlled for exchange rates and nominal GDP.
Nominal exchange rates were calculated as annual averages of closing daily
exchange rates, and were taken from Global Financial Data.27 Nominal GDP
was taken from Klasing and Milionis (2014), adjusted for interwar borders
using the adjustment coeﬃcients from Broadberry and Klein (2012).
4 Theoretical framework
As Broda and Weinstein (2006) (whose notation we largely use) and others
do, we consider a representative agent with a nested CES utility function
26Except for gold, silver, bullion, books, magazines and newspapers.
27https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html, accessed June 2013.
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Figure 3: Nested utility function
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(see Figure 3). At the top level, utility in period t, Ut, depends on the
consumption of a domestic good Dt, and of an aggregate imported good Mt:
Ut = (↵DtD
( 1)/
t + (1  ↵Dt)M ( 1)/t )/( 1) (1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
At the second level, the aggregate imported good is defined as being a
CES composite of imported goods g 2 Gt where Gt is the set of all goods
imported in period t:
Mt = (
X
g2Gt
↵gtM
(  1)/ 
gt )
 /(  1) (2)
  is the elasticity of substitution between imported goods, while Mgt repre-
sents total imports of good g in year t.
Finally, Mgt is defined as an Armington aggregate of imports of good g
from diﬀerent countries c, each of which (following Broda and Weinstein) we
refer to as a variety :
Mgt = (
X
c2Igt
 gctm
( g 1)/ g
gct )
 g/( g 1) (3)
Heremgct represents imports of good g from country c in year t; Igt ⇢ C is the
subset of all countries C supplying good g to the UK in year t; the  gct’s are
taste parameters; and  g is the Armington elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent varieties of good g. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that
Igt (and also Gt) is fixed 8g, t: we are therefore holding the extensive margin
of trade fixed. This should not greatly influence our results, given that, as
Section 3 showed, Britain’s trade collapse and subsequent recovery occurred
almost entirely along the intensive margin.
On the supply side, we adopt a simplified version of the model suggested
by Anderson and Neary (1996). The economy is endowed with just one
factor of production, which we will label GDPt. This is transformed into two
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goods, an export good Xt and the domestic good Dt, via a constant elasticity
of transformation production function:
GDPt = (↵
DD(1+⌘)/⌘t + (1  ↵D)X(1+⌘)/⌘t )⌘/(1+⌘) (4)
where ⌘ is the elasticity of transformation between the two outputs, and ↵D
is the benchmark share of domestic good production in GDP.
We will initially assume that the UK takes world import prices, inclusive
of non-policy-related transport costs, pWgct, as given. Domestic prices are then
given by
pDgct = ⌧gct ⇥ pWgct (5)
where (⌧gct 1) is the ad valorem policy-related trade cost (that is to say, costs
associated with tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers to trade) applying to imports
of good g from country c in year t. Let these policy-related trade costs be
defined as follows:
⌧gct = (
nY
i=1
b
 igct
i )⇥ (1 + tgct) (6)
where bi   1 is the ad valorem equivalent of facing non-tariﬀ barrier i;  igct
is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if imports of good g from country
c face barrier i in year t, and zero otherwise; and tgct is the ad valorem tariﬀ
imposed on imports of good g from country c in year t.
Given domestic prices pDgct, it is straightforward to derive prices of the
Armington aggregates Mgt, pMgt , and of the composite aggregate imported
good Mt, pMt . The representative agent is endowed with GDPt and receives
all tariﬀ revenue, as well as any rents associated with non-tariﬀ barriers to
trade (i.e. quota rents). He/she maximises utility given by equation (1)
subject to the usual budget constraint, while producers maximise pDtDt +
pXtXt subject to (4).
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Units are defined so that all domestic prices are initially one, implying
that world prices are equal to 1/⌧gct. Given data on ⌧gct, mgct, and GDPt,
all remaining parameters in the model (in particular the  gct’s and ↵D) can
be pinned down, and the general equilibrium for the economy solved. For
example, this can be done for a year when protection was in place, say 1935.
We can then compute a variety of counterfactual equilibria. For example, we
could set ⌧gc1935 = 18g, c and  gc1935 = 08g, c and compute a counterfactual,
free trade equilibrium for 1935.
Our main interest is in the share of imports coming from the Empire.
Given our nested CES demand structure,  and ⌘ are irrelevant to this,
although they matter for the total level of imports. We therefore set the
elasticity of transformation to 5, as in Anderson and Neary (1996); and set
 equal to 1.5, as in Levchenko et al. (2010, p. 227). This allows us to focus
on the other two elasticities in the model, which matter for our results. We
will estimate  g econometrically, and explore the sensitivity of our results to
changes in  .
5 Econometric results
In order to estimate the  g’s in equation (3) above, we begin with the struc-
tural gravity equations (4)-(6) presented in Anderson and Yotov (2010, pp.
2159-60), bearing in mind that in all cases the destination country is the UK.
Using our notation, their equation (4) becomes:
V Dgct =
Mgt ⇥ Ygct
Ygt
⇥
✓
⌧gct
Pgt ⇥ ⇧gct
◆1  g
(7)
where V Dgct = pDgct ⇥mgct = ⌧gct ⇥ pWgct ⇥mgct is the value of imports of good
g from country c in year t, measured in domestic (UK) prices; Ygct is the
output of good g in country c in year t; Ygt is world output of good g in year
t; Pgt is the inward multilateral resistance term for good g in the UK in year
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t; and ⇧gct is the outward multilateral resistance term for good g in country
c in year t.
One issue that we have to confront is that our import data are c.i.f.,
and valued at world prices, inclusive of transport and other trade costs not
related to British trade barriers. We are not interested in these other trade
costs, since we are holding them fixed in our analysis. We cannot multiply
our import value data by ⌧gct, to obtain imports valued at (policy-inclusive)
domestic prices as do Caliendo and Parro (2014, p. 15), since ⌧gct includes
quota rents which we will be estimating econometrically. We therefore prefer
to work with the original c.i.f. trade data. Our dependent variable is thus:
V Wgct = p
W
gct ⇥mgct = V Dgct/⌧gct =
Mgt ⇥ Ygct
Ygt
⇥ ⌧  g ⇥
✓
1
Pgt ⇥ ⇧gt
◆1  g
(8)
Substituting (6) into (8), and taking logs, we obtain:
ln(V Wgct) = ln(Mgt) + ln(Ygct)  ln(Ygt)   gln(1 + tgct)   g
nX
i=1
ln(bi) igct
  (1   g)ln(Pgt)  (1   g)ln(⇧gct) + ugct (9)
where ugct is the error term. Good times year fixed eﬀects are used to control
for Mgt, Ygt and Pgt. Intuitively, by controlling in this manner for total
imports of a given good in a given year (e.g. wheat in 1933), we are focussing
on the choice between, say, Canadian and Argentinian wheat in 1933, which
is what we want to do in order to estimate  g. Since we do not have data on
foreign outputs of individual commodities, we are forced to use GDP instead
(so we replace Ygct with GDPct in equation (9) above). We also control for
the bilateral exchange rate, Ect. Finally, since we only have data for one
country, the UK, we are unable to include time-varying outward multilateral
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resistance terms. We therefore include good times country (i.e. variety) fixed
eﬀects, in the place of ⇧gct. Our estimating equation is thus:
ln(V Wgct) = ln(GDPct)+ln(Ect)  gln(1+tgct)  g
nX
i=1
ln(bi) igct+dgt+dgc+ugct
(10)
where dgt and dgc represent good times year, and good times country, fixed
eﬀects.
In principle equation (10) should be estimated for every good (in which
case the good times country, and good times year, fixed eﬀects would collapse
into country and year fixed eﬀects), but we lack suﬃcient observations to do
this. We therefore estimate across categories of goods g, assuming a common
elasticity  g for all goods within this category. We begin by computing the
elasticites for four broad categories: agricultural goods; manufactures; raw
materials; and “colonial” goods subject to revenue tariﬀs. We follow San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and use a PPML estimator to estimate (10).
Since we are including both good times country and good times year fixed
eﬀects, we estimate the equations using the poi2hdfe estimator available in
Stata (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010; Figueiredo et al., 2015). Appendix 6
establishes that our econometric and simulation results are robust to alter-
native estimators.28
The results, given in Table 3, seem reasonable. We control for the Italian
trade sanctions of 1935-6, and the foot and mouth disease embargo instituted
in 1926. Both had a severe negative impact on trade flows. Signing a trade
28A potential concern might be that tariﬀs rose disproportionately on goods whose
imports rose more, or fell less, during the preceding period. If rising imports prior to
1931 were for some reason correlated with import trends after 1931, our estimated trade
elasticities would be biased. Table 10 in Appendix 6 shows that this is not an issue: there
was absolutely no correlation between import trends during 1928-31 and the change in
tariﬀ rates after 1931. Note also that the UK does not fit the argument in Eichengreen
and Irwin (2010) according to which countries that stayed on the gold standard longer
were more protectionist.
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Table 3: PPML gravity estimates by broad category, 1924-1938
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Broad category Agricultural Manufacturing Raw Materials Revenue
Log(1 + tariﬀ) -5.174*** -6.411*** -17.47*** -1.690***
(1.818) (1.275) (2.669) (0.458)
Quota -1.008***
(0.337)
Embargo -3.858***
(0.645)
VER -0.165
(0.187)
Treaty 0.0425 0.0772 0.239* 0.185
(0.192) (0.291) (0.134) (0.328)
Quota*treaty 0.0865
(0.150)
Cartel -0.892*** -0.643 0.280
(0.246) (0.446) (0.199)
Italian sanctions -2.655*** -2.271*** -5.739*** -2.803***
(0.173) (0.193) (0.253) (0.236)
Log(GDP) 0.493 -0.816 -2.127** 2.131***
(0.483) (0.831) (0.935) (0.790)
Log(exchange rate) 0.110 0.114 0.129 0.270
(0.213) (0.238) (0.286) (0.242)
Observations 3,853 13,468 8,820 2,906
Note: dependent variable is the value of imports, by good, country and year.
Estimates control for good*country and good*year fixed eﬀects. Estimates
computed using poi2hdfe. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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treaty with the UK boosted raw materials exports to Britain, but otherwise
had no direct impact on trade. As mentioned in Section 3, we also coded
a second variable relating to trade treaties: this was equal to one if a trade
treaty that a country signed with the UKmentioned a good which was subject
to quotas at that time. Neither this variable, which is something like an
interaction eﬀect between treaties and quotas29, nor a dummy indicating
whether imports of commodities were subject to a voluntary export restraint,
had any eﬀect on trade flows.30
Our main interest, however, is in the impact of British trade policy. All
the elasticities of trade with respect to tariﬀs are negative and highly sta-
tistically significant. The fact that the elasticity is so much lower for goods
subject to revenue tariﬀs makes sense, as is the fact that the raw materials
elasticity is so high. On the other hand, we were surprised that the agri-
cultural elasticity was slightly lower than the manufacturing one. Quotas
also had a highly significant impact on agricultural imports. The coeﬃcient
on the agricultural tariﬀ variable (  g) and on the quota dummy variable
jointly imply (from equation (10)) that quotas were equivalent to a 21.5% ad
valorem tariﬀ. Interestingly, cartel membership had almost as big an impact
on manufactured imports.31
Table 4 provides similar estimates for nine narrower categories. ‘Grain’
includes barley, maize, wheat and rice (SITC categories 041-044); ‘Animal’
includes butter, eggs and meat (SITC categories 011, 012, 023, and 025);
‘Machinery’ includes SITC categories 711, 712, 714-716, and 721; ‘Minerals’
includes metals, coal and petroleum (SITC categories 311-313, 681, and 682);
‘Textiles’ includes both yarn and cloth (SITC codes 651-653); ‘Miscellaneous
29Although it is separately coded, rather than being mechanically computed as an in-
teraction eﬀect, since not all treaties mentioned the same goods.
30The coeﬃcients are correctly signed, but small and statistically insignificant.
31One possible reason for the lower agricultural elasticities might in principle be the
presence of binding quotas. However, estimating equation (10) without those agricul-
tural goods subject to quotas did not change our results. (Romalis (2007, p. 424) finds
something similar.)
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inputs’ includes such items as fertilisers, rubber, hides and skins, raw cotton
and silk, and hair (SITC codes 211, 231, 261-263, 271, and 561); ‘Miscella-
neous industry’ includes vehicles and rubber manufactures, including tyres
(SITC codes 629, 713, and 732); ‘Food oils’ includes oils and oilseeds of var-
ious kinds (SITC codes 221 and 412); and ‘Colonial’ includes coﬀee, sugar,
tea and tobacco (SITC categories 061, 071, 074, and 121). Once again the
results seem fairly sensible; trade elasticites were particularly high for grains
and food oils, and particularly small for textiles and colonial goods.32 Trade
treaties were associated with higher imports in the cases of miscellaneous
inputs and food oils; cartel membership lowered imports of “mineral” prod-
ucts; curiously, the cartel coeﬃcient is positive for colonial goods.33 The
coeﬃcients in column (2) imply that the presence of a quota was equivalent
to an ad valorem tariﬀ of 25.9%.
6 Trade policy counterfactuals
Armed with the trade elasticites estimated in the previous section, we can
now turn our attention to calculating the impact of Britain’s adoption of
protection in 1931, and the subsequent Ottawa accords, on the pattern of
British imports, using the model outlined in Section 4. For each year, we
solve the model using the actual tariﬀs and quotas in place during that year,
and then compute equilibria for various counterfactual sets of tariﬀs and
quotas.34
First, we explore the impact of the changes made to British trade pol-
icy from 1931 onwards, using the elasticities for our four broad categories of
goods implied by Table 3. We start with the impact of tariﬀs. To this end,
32On the other hand, the coeﬃcient is also relatively small for minerals. Perhaps this
might be due to the widespread cartels in the sector.
33The cartel in question was the Chadbourne sugar agreement, which the UK joined in
late 1937.
34The model is solved using MPSGE as a subsystem of Gams (Rutherford, 1999). The
GAMS code is available on request.
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Figure 4: The impact of changes in tariﬀ policy after 1930
we begin by setting tariﬀs and quotas equal to their actual values for every
year between 1924 and 1930. However, in 1931 and subsequent years, ad val-
orem tariﬀs for each commodity and country are frozen at their 1930 values.
(Quotas are however maintained at their actual levels, so as to focus on the
impact of tariﬀs only.) Figure 4 graphs the actual Empire share of British
imports between 1924 and 1938, and the counterfactual share holding tariﬀs
fixed at their 1930 levels. It does so using the Armington elasticities,  g, es-
timated in Table 3, and using three values for  , the elasticity of substitution
in the “middle level” CES utility nest defined by equation (2) above.
As can be seen, tariﬀs mattered a lot for the evolution of the Empire’s
share of British imports. For example, between 1930 and 1935 this share
rose from 27% to 39%. However, if Britain had not instituted higher and
more discriminatory tariﬀs from 1931 onwards, it would only have increased
to 34% (assuming an elasticity of substitution between goods of 1) or to as
little as 32% (assuming   = 2).
What if tariﬀs had not been increased after 1930, and quotas had not
30
24
28
32
36
40
44
1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Em
pi
re
	s
ha
re
	o
f	U
K	
im
po
rts
	(
pe
r	c
en
t)
Year
Actual Tariffs	only,	elasticity=1
Tariffs	&	quotas,	elasticity=1 Tariffs	&	quotas,	elasticity=1.5
Tariffs	&	quotas,	elasticity=2
Figure 5: The impact of changes in trade policy (tariﬀs and quotas) after
1930
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Figure 6: Impact of imposing 1935 trade policies throughout the period
been introduced either? Figure 5 shows what the share of Empire would
have been under this counterfactual scenario; for the sake of comparison, it
also plots the impact of freezing tariﬀ policies only, as in Figure 4. As can be
seen, quotas further increased the Empire’s share of British trade, by some
two percentage points. If trade policy had remained frozen at its 1930 level,
the Empire would have accounted for between 30% (  = 2) and 32% (  = 1)
of UK imports in 1935, whereas in fact it accounted for 39%. Assuming that
  was equal to 1, trade policy accounted for 70% of the shift between 1930
and 1933, and 60% of the shift between 1930 and either 1934 or 1935. On
the other hand, as Figures 4 and 5 show, the Empire would have continued
to increase its share of British imports in the late 1930s, perhaps reflecting
geopolitical tensions, or the trade diversion associated with other trade blocs.
An alternative is to ask: what would the share of the Empire in UK
imports have been before 1930, had the policy shift of 1931-1932 happened
earlier? To answer this question, we fix all tariﬀs and quotas at their 1935
levels for each year. Not surprisingly, the Empire’s share would have been a
32
lot higher under this scenario: between 34 and 35% in 1928, as opposed to
the actual figure of 28.5% (Figure 6).
Finally, we can ask what the Empire’s share of UK imports would have
been if Britain had pursued strictly free trade policies thoughout. Setting all
tariﬀs and quotas equal to zero leads to the counterfactual Imperial shares
plotted in Figure 7. As can be seen, these are substantially lower than the
shares actually observed: under free trade the Empire’s share would have
been 25% in 1935 if   = 1, or as low as 13% if   = 2. Two features of this
counterfactual experiment are particularly noteworthy. First, there would
only have been a very modest increase in the Empire’s share under free
trade during the 1930s. Second, while   had only a small impact on the
counterfactuals plotted in Figures 4 through 6, it matters a lot for the free
trade counterfactual. This is consistent with the observation that changes in
trade policy over time varied less across goods than the level of trade policy.35
Finally, what if we had used the elasticites implied by Table 4? It would
be disconcerting if our results depended greatly on the level of aggregation
used in computing elasticites. Fortunately, little changes (although more
disaggregation strengthens our results). The counterfactual Empire shares
under the “no policy shift in 1931” scenario are lower than those plotted in
Figure 5, implying that policy mattered more than the previous discussion
suggested. However, the eﬀect is small.36 Basing our counterfactual analysis
on Table 3 is conservative, but not excessively so.
7 Conclusion
Previous papers have looked at the interwar relationship between trade bloc
membership and bilateral trade flows, and concluded that trade blocs mat-
35For example, the variance across goods in the unweighted tariﬀ was 0.031 in 1929 and
0.035 in 1935, whereas the variance across goods in the change in the tariﬀ between 1929
and 1935 was 0.011.
36See Appendix 6.
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Figure 7: Impact of imposing free trade throughout
tered less than traditionally thought. Membership in these blocs was not
randomly assigned; controlling for a “trade bloc” fixed eﬀect, equal to one
both before and after the formation of the bloc, leaves little for the formation
of the bloc to explain.
In this paper we have looked at the relationship between British trade
policies, and British imports, using detailed information on 258 product cat-
egories. Controlling for country times product (or “variety”) fixed eﬀects,
as well as for product times year fixed eﬀects, we have found that the shift
towards protection in 1931 and 1932 substantially increased the share of UK
imports coming from the British Empire. Changing British trade policies can
explain about 70% of the increase in the Empire’s share of UK imports be-
tween 1930 and 1933. Later on in the decade, other forces served to increase
that share still further, but the impact of British protectionism, and the dis-
criminatory trade policies agreed at Ottawa, remained substantial. As late
as 1938, those policies can still account for around 50% of the shift towards
Empire experienced since 1930.
34
Methodologically, this paper suggests that there are substantial advan-
tages to using disaggregated data, and to looking at what trade blocs do,
as opposed to simply looking at whether they exist or not. Historically, the
paper suggests that interwar trade policy mattered more for trade patterns
than the cliometric literature has suggested. It certainly mattered a lot in
the British case; whether what was true for the UK was true elsewhere as
well is a question which we hope that future research will address.
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Appendix 1. Commodity classification
An Appendix Table, available at http://tinyurl.com/hlx9v4b, contains a list
of the 812 products which entered our dataset, and indicates how these data
were subsequently aggregated. The first column gives the original product
categories for which we collected data. The second column shows, for each
of these products, what the product category was in which it was eventually
included. There are 258 of these product categories. The third column shows
the SITC 3-digit category in which each of our 258 product categories belong,
and the fourth column indicates whether the product was classified by us as
being agricultural, manufactured, a raw material, or a “colonial” or revenue
good. We are using the original Standard International Trade Classification,
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Revision 1, based on Statistical Oﬃce of the United Nations (1951; 1953),
since this is more appropriate for this period than more recent revisions.
In order to compare our sample with the (aggregate) oﬃcial trade statis-
tics, as in Table 2, we needed to provide definitions for these four categories
that applied to the aggregate trade statistics as well as to our sample. We
did so as follows:
• Agricultural: defined as SITC 0-1 (incl. alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages and tobacco), but some items were subsequently classified as
“revenue imports” and classified separately (see below). For practical
reasons we also included living animals not used for food (SITC cate-
gory 921), which in the British case mainly means bees (but none of
these were in our sample).
• Raw materials: SITC 2-4
• Manufactures: SITC 5-8.
• We defined the following items as tropical foodstuﬀs (often subject to
revenue duties) and revenue goods (commodities in italics are part of
our sample):
– Tapioca, arrowroot, sago, and the like (duty-free in 1924)
– Cotton seed cake and meal (duty-free in 1924)
– Seeds, feeding: Dari or Durra, Dhol or Pigeon Pea, Gram or chick;
Millet (duty-free in 1924)
– Fruits and nuts: Bananas, Brazil nuts, Pineapples (duty-free in
1924)
– Spices (cinnamon, ginger, pepper, cloves, other) (duty-free in 1924)
– Cocoa (raw, husks and shells, butter), as well as Cocoa prepara-
tions: bars and blocks, confectionary, etc. (dutiable in 1924)
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– Coﬀee (all sorts, also prepared and mixed with chicory) (dutiable
in 1924)
– Rum (dutiable in 1924)
– Sugar, unrefined (this includes beetroot sugar), refined, molasses
(all dutiable in 1924) as well as Glucose, Saccharin, Caramel (du-
tiable in 1924)
– Chutney (dutiable in 1924)
– Coconuts, sugared (dutiable in 1924)
– Fruit, preserved in sugar: Pineapples (dutiable in 1924)
– Ginger, preserved in sugar or syrup (dutiable in 1924)
– Tea (dutiable in 1924) and Tea for the manufacture of caﬀeine
(dutiable in 1924)
– Tobacco, unmanufactured (dutiable in 1924) and tobacco, manu-
factured (dutiable in 1924)
– Sugar, articles containing, not for use as food. (duty-free in 1924)
– Petroleum (lamp oil, motor spirit, lubricating oil, gas oil, fuel oil,
etc); mineral jelly; paraﬃn wax; lubricating oils, mixed, n.e.s (all
dutiable from 1924)
– Crude petroleum (dutiable from 1928 only)
– Raw silk under diﬀerent names (changing in 1925): Silk raw,
knubs, noils and waste; Silk cocoons and waste of all kinds (undis-
charged, wholly or partly discharged; noils); Silk raw, discharged,
wholly or in part discharged. (all dutiable from 1 July 1925)
Imitation rum and other alcoholic beverages (brandy, etc.) were not classified
as revenue imports, but are not in our dataset anyway.
Another problem is that the SITC classification was not in use at the
time. Fortunately, the British classification is quite similar to the SITC
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Rev. The broad group I (Food drink and tobacco) corresponds to SITC
0+1; II (Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured) matches SITC
2-4 and III matches SITC 5-8 (Manufactures). Category IV, animals, not
for food, includes items (breeding animals) that SITC groups under 0, and
some other animals (bees, elephants, etc.) that fall under SITC 9. We
include these in food for our purpose, but the overall amount is very small
and as mentioned earlier they are not in our sample. We ignore item V
(Parcel post) since its composition is unknown; this would fall under SITC
category 911. Small values of platinum and gold leaves are included in the
British statistics under III.D (non-ferrous metals and manufactures thereof),
and should probably be excluded as per SITC, but we have not taken them
out. Deviations between SITC and British classification led to the following
regrouping: 1. From I.E (food) into SITC 412 (raw materials): vegetable oils,
other than essential, refined, edible (coconut oil, cottonseed oil, ground nut
oil, olive oil, palm oil, palm kernel oil, other sorts, n.e.s); 2. From II.N (raw
materials) to SITC 074 (food): tea for the manufacture of caﬀeine; 3. From
III.A. (manufactures) to SITC 311 (raw materials): coke, manufactured fuel;
4. From III.N. (manufactures) to SITC 292 (raw materials): ipecacauanha,
other roots, chinchona bark, nux vomica, aloes, ergot of rye, opium, senna,
etc.; 5. From III.T (manufactures) to SITC 271 (raw materials): guano,
manufactured, and compound manufactures (including bonemeal, etc.); 6.
From III.T (manufactures) to SITC 061 (food): sugar, articles containing,
not for use as food; 7. From IV.T (Animals, not for food) to SITC 001-09
(food): breeding animals (bulls, cows and heifers, calves, sheep and lambs,
swine); horses; others (bees, etc. the latter should oﬃcially be under 921,
but their total amount is negligible). Unclear, but left in food: 8. I.E oleo-
margarine and oleo-oil, and refined tallow (premier jus et al.). Margarine is
in 091-01 (food); oleo-oil and premier jus would be in 411-02 (raw materials).
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Appendix 2. List of countries used in the analy-
sis
The table below provides a list of the 42 countries used in our analysis, and
indicates how they were described in the original sources. In some cases we
had to type in data for several regions to calculate the data for one country.
In the case of Spain, we summed over the Canary Isles and Spain; in the case
of Malaysia, we summed over British Borneo, the Malay States, the Straits
Settlements, and (if reported as such) the British East Indies ; and in the
case of the Dutch East Indies we summed over Dutch Borneo, Dutch New
Guinea, Java, and other Dutch possessions in the Indian Seas.
Countries in
dataset
As described in original sources
Algeria Algeria
Argentine
Republic
Argentine Republic
Australia Australia
Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium
Brazil Brazil
British India British India
British West
India Islands -
Bahamas,
Jamaica and
Dependencies,
Trinidad and
Tobago, and
others
British West India Islands - Bahamas, Jamaica and
Dependencies, Trinidad and Tobago, and others
Canada Canada
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Chile Chile
China (exclusive
of Hong Kong,
Macao and leased
territories)
China (exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao and leased
territories)
Colombia Colombia
Cuba Cuba
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia
Denmark (incl.
Faroe Islands)
Denmark (incl. Faroe Islands)
Dutch East India Dutch Borneo; Dutch New Guinea; Java,; Other
Dutch Possessions in the Indian Seas
Dutch West India
Islands
Dutch West India Islands
Egypt Egypt
France France
Germany Germany
Hong Kong Hong Kong
Hungary Hungary
Italy Italy
Japan (including
Formosa and
Japanese leased
territories in
China)
Japan (including Formosa and Japanese leased
territories in China)
Luxemburg Luxemburg
46
Malaysia (British
Borneo, Malay
States, Straits
Settlements,
British East
Indies)
British Borneo - State of North Borneo, Brunei,
Sarawak; Malay States - Federated and Unfederated
(Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu);
Straits Settlements and Dependencies (incl. Labuan);
British East Indies
Mexico Mexico
Netherlands Netherlands
New Zealand New Zealand
Norway Norway
Persia Persia, Iran
Poland (incl.
Dantzig)
Poland (incl. Dantzig)
Roumania Roumania
Soviet Union
(Russia)
Soviet Union (Russia)
Spain Spain, Canary Islands
Sweden Sweden
Switzerland Switzerland
Turkey, European
and Asiatic
Turkey, European and Asiatic
Union of South
Africa (incl.
South West
Africa Territory)
Union of South Africa (incl. South West Africa
Territory)
United States of
America
United States of America
Venezuela Venezuela
Yugoslavia Yugoslavia
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Appendix 3. Non-tariﬀ barriers to trade
The table below lists the non-tariﬀ barriers to trade in operation during our
period, aﬀecting imports of those goods which are in our sample. In each case,
the table provides the product categories, countries, and years concerned.
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Panel A. Quantitative Restrictions
Good (see Appendix 1) Countries Years
Meat. Bacon All non-empire 1933-8
Meat. Beef All non-empire 1933-8
Meat. Ham All non-empire 1933-8
Meat. Lamb. Frozen All non-empire 1933-8
Meat. Mutton All non-empire 1933-8
Meat. Pork. Frozen All non-empire 1935-8
Panel B. Voluntary Export Restraints
Good (see Appendix 1) Countries Years
Eggs. in Shell All non-empire 1934
Eggs. not in Shell. Albumen All non-empire 1934
Eggs. not in Shell. Dried (except Albumen) All non-empire 1934
Eggs. not in Shell. Liquid or Frozen All non-empire 1934
Meat. Bacon Canada 1933-8
Meat. Lamb. Frozen Australia, New Zealand 1933-8
Meat. Pork. Frozen Australia, Canada, New Zealand 1935-8
Panel C. Embargo
Good (see Appendix 1) Countries Years
Meat. Lamb. Fresh All continental Europe (Austria,
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark
(incl. Faroe Islands), France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland (incl. Dantzig), Romania,
Soviet Union (Russia), Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia)
1926-38
Meat. Pork. Fresh All continental Europe (as above) 1926-38
Panel D. Italian Sanctions
Good (see Appendix 1) Countries Years
All 258 goods Italy 1936
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Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research (1943, pp.
75-121, p. 267).
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Appendix 4. Cartels
The table below provides data on the cartels with British membership in op-
eration during this period, aﬀecting the goods in our sample. International
producer cartels in which the United Kingdom (mostly through significant
business associations) was a member were coded from Suslow (2005, Ap-
pendix 1). This was supplemented by information on primary goods, and es-
pecially international sugar cartels, in Dye and Sicotte (2006), US Secretary
of Agriculture (1933), and Rowe (1965); and by details on individual manu-
factured goods cartels in Benham (1941, pp. 69-70), Barbezat (1989, 1991),
Kudo (1994), Schröter (2012), and British Parliamentary Papers (1937, p.
117). We only include formal cartel agreements concluded by UK domestic
producers, trade organizations, or the government; we exclude unsuccessful
“attempts at cartelization” as defined by Haussmann and Ahearn (1944), such
as that in petroleum, as well as cartels in which the UK was not involved.
Cartel Countries Good (see Appendix 1) Years
International
Agree-
ment
Regarding
the Regu-
lation of
Produc-
tion and
Marketing
of Sugar,
Septem-
ber
1937
Australia; Belgium; Brazil; British India;
China (exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao
and leased territories); Cuba;
Czechoslovakia; Dutch East; India;
France; Germany; Hungary; Poland (incl.
Dantzig); Soviet Union (Russia); Union of
South Africa (incl. South West Africa
Territory); United States of America;
Yugoslavia
Molasses and invert
sugar; Sugar. Articles
containing. Not for use as
food; Sugar. Refined;
Sugar. Unrefined.
Beetroot; Sugar.
Unrefined. Cane and
other sorts
1938
Coal Poland (incl. Dantzig) Coal 1935-8
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Phosphate
rock
Algeria, Egypt, France, Netherlands,
United States
Fertilizers. n.e.s..
Phosphate of lime and
rock phosphate
1933-8
Nitrogen,
Conven-
tion
Interna-
tionale de
l’Azote
(CIA), 1
China (exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao
and leased territories); Germany;
Netherlands
Potassium compounds.
Nitrate; Sodium
compounds. Nitrate
1929-30
Nitrogen,
Conven-
tion
Interna-
tionale de
l’Azote
(CIA), 2
Belgium; Czechoslovakia; France;
Germany; Italy; Norway; Netherlands;
Poland (incl. Dantzig)
Potassium compounds.
Nitrate; Sodium
compounds. Nitrate
1930-1
Nitrogen,
Conven-
tion
Interna-
tionale de
l’Azote
(CIA), 3
Belgium; Czechoslovakia; France;
Germany; Italy; Norway; Netherlands;
Poland (incl. Dantzig); Switzerland;
China (exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao
and leased territories); Japan (including
Formosa and Japanese leased territories
in China) (China and Japan from 1934)
Potassium compounds.
Nitrate; Sodium
compounds. Nitrate
1932-8
Synthetic
nitrogen
China (exclusive of Hong Kong, Macao
and leased territories); Germany; Norway,
United States
Potassium compounds.
Nitrate; Sodium
compounds. Nitrate
1926-38
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Ferrosilicon Czechoslovakia, France, Germany,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
States, Yugoslavia
Ferro-Alloys. Other
Descriptions
1929-38
Linen
Thread
Czechoslovakia, France, Germany,
Switzerland
Linen Thread 1926-38
Rayon Germany, Italy Silk and artificial silk yarn 1927-38
European
or Inter-
national
Steel
Cartel
Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
Germany, Hungary, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Poland (incl. Dantzig)
Ingots. Other than of
special steel; Iron and
Steel. Hoop and Strip;
Iron and Steel. Plates
and Sheets; Iron. Blooms,
Bars, Angles, shapes,
sections etc.; Special
steel. Ingots, Blooms,
Bars, Angles etc.; Steel.
Blooms, Bars, Angles,
shapes, sections etc.
1935-8
Copper
(refined) 1
France, Germany, United States Copper. Bars, blocks,
slabs, ingots, and cakes -
Elektrolytic; Copper.
Bars, blocks, slabs,
ingots, and cakes - Other
1927-1929
Copper
(refined) 2
Belgium, France, United States Copper. Bars, blocks,
slabs, ingots, and cakes -
Elektrolytic; Copper.
Bars, blocks, slabs,
ingots, and cakes - Other
1932
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Copper
(refined) 3
Belgium, France, United States Copper. Bars, blocks,
slabs, ingots, and cakes -
Elektrolytic; Copper.
Bars, blocks, slabs,
ingots, and cakes - Other
1935-8
Electric
cables
(high
tension)
Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark (incl. Far_e Islands), France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland (incl. Dantzig), Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland
Electric wires and cables,
insulated
1928-1938
Heavy
electrical
equipment
Germany, Switzerland, United States Converters and
transformers, incl. Coils,
Rotary; Converters and
transformers, incl. Coils,
static; Electrical
machinery. Generators;
Starting, control,
magnetos and switch gear
1931-8
Incandescent
electric
lamps
France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands Electric Lamps and parts
thereof
1925-38
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Appendix 5. Trade treaties
We have coded two variables to take account of the existence of trade treaties.
The first, labelled “Treaty” in Tables 3 and 4, is designed to account for the
existence of treaties concluded to mitigate the impact of the Import Duties
Act and the Ottawa Agreements from 1932. We identified such treaties on
the basis of National Institute of Economic and Social Research (1943, pp.
172-9). We then read the original treaty texts as published in the British
Parliamentary Papers (http://parlipapers.proquest.com/; see below for the
Command Paper Number identifying them). Based on this reading, we con-
structed a second dummy variable, labelled “Quota*treaty” in Tables 3 and
4, which is equal to one if a treaty in force mentions the good in question, in
the context of quantitative restrictions on imports of that good into Britain,
if indeed such quantitative restrictions are in force. For example, the Roca-
Runciman treaty of May 1933 secured a certain level of market access for
chilled beef from Argentina. Quantitative restrictions on beef imports had
been in force in Britain since 1 January 1933, so “Quota*treaty” was coded
as ‘1’ for “beef” imported from Argentina between 1933 and the end of the
sample (the treaty was renewed in 1936). On the other hand, “salted beef”,
which is a separate good, was not mentioned in the treaty (and was not
in any case subject to quantitative restrictions). It was thus coded as ‘0’
throughout. For both variables, treaties had to be in force during at least
six months in a year to be taken into account. A treaty concluded with the
US in November 1938 was therefore too late to be entered into the dataset.
Note: The command number in the table below identifies the treaty doc-
ument in the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers dataset.
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Panel A. Treaty
Country Years Goods BPP command number
Argentine Republic 1932-38 Eggs. in Shell / Hair. Horse /
Maize / Meat, Lamb, Frozen /
Meat. Beef / Meat. Mutton /
Wheat / Wool. Raw. Alpaca,
Vicuna and Llama / Wool. Raw.
Camels’ Hair / Wool. Raw. Mohair
/ Wool. Raw. sheep’s and lambs’
wool / Wool. Raw. Wool noils /
Wool. Raw. Wool waste
4492; 4494; 5324
Denmark 1933-38 Butter / Eggs. in Shell / Eggs. not
in Shell. Albumen / Eggs. not in
Shell. Dried (except Albumen) /
Eggs. not in Shell. Liquid or
Frozen / Meat. Bacon / Meat.
Ham
4424; 5400
France 1934-38 Silk and artificial silk textiles 4632
Norway 1933-38 Butter / Eggs. in Shell / Eggs. not
in Shell. Albumen / Eggs. not in
Shell. Dried (except Albumen) /
Eggs. not in Shell. Liquid or
Frozen / Meat. Bacon / Meat.
Ham / Meat. Poultry and Game
4500
Poland 1936-38 Butter / Eggs. in Shell / Eggs. not
in Shell. Albumen / Eggs. not in
Shell. Dried (except Albumen) /
Eggs. not in Shell. Liquid or
Frozen / Meat. Bacon / Meat.
Ham / Meat. Poultry and Game /
Sugar. Unrefined. Beetroot
4984; 5599
Sweden 1933-38 Butter / Eggs. in Shell / Eggs. not
in Shell. Albumen / Eggs. not in
Shell. Dried (except Albumen) /
Eggs. not in Shell. Liquid or
Frozen / Meat. Bacon / Meat.
Ham
4401
Panel B. Quota*treaty
Country Years Goods
Argentine Republic 1933-38 Meat. Beef
Denmark 1933-38 Meat. Bacon / Meat. Ham
Norway 1933-38 Meat. Bacon / Meat. Ham
Poland 1936-38 Meat. Bacon / Meat. Ham
Sweden 1933-38 Meat. Bacon / Meat. Ham
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Appendix 6. Robustness exercises and pre-trends
Our benchmark results, reported in the body of the paper, use PPML meth-
ods to estimate trade elasticities, in line with the literature. However, we
are mindful of the injunction in Head and Mayer (2014) to use a variety of
methods when estimating these elasticities. Unfortunately, our specification
involves so many fixed eﬀects that we are unable to use the Gamma PML or
EK Tobit estimators (we were only able to implement PPML methods be-
cause of the poi2hdfe routine developed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010)
and Figueiredo et al. (2015)). However, we did re-estimate the trade elastici-
ties using OLS methods and observations with positive trade values. We also
re-estimated them by interacting category dummies with tariﬀ rates, in the
context of regressions using all available observations (as opposed to splitting
the sample and running one regression per category, which is our preferred
method and the one used in the results reported in the main body of the
text). Tables 7 and 8 show that while the trade elasticities for particular
commodity categories change when diﬀerent methods are used, the results
are broadly speaking quite robust.
What is more important for our purposes is to establish to what extent
our estimates of the impact of British trade policy on the direction of trade
depend on the econometric methods used to estimate the trade elasticities.
Table 9 therefore reports the share of the shift towards the Empire, between
1930 and 1933, that can be explained by the trade policy shift after 1930. It
does so using the trade elasticities produced by all four estimation methods,
for both our four broad and nine narrower commodity categories.37 As can
be seen, our results are extremely robust, with the results clustering around
the 70 per cent figure cited in the main body of the text. Note that as the
level of disaggregation used increases, the importance of policy rises.
37There are two coeﬃcients in Table 8 which are insignificantly positive. Both occur in
specifications pooling across all commodity categories. In these two cases, we assume that
the relevant trade elasticity is zero.
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Table 7: Robustness excercises: trade elasticities, broad categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method Agriculture Manufacturing Raw materials Colonial
PPML -5.174*** -6.585*** -17.77*** -1.690***
(1.820) (1.329) (2.327) (0.459)
PPML, pooled
with
interaction
eﬀects
-5.237*** -5.238*** -13.74*** -1.559***
(1.397) (1.304) (2.204) (0.404)
OLS -6.019** -3.805** -7.492* -0.796
(2.824) (1.788) (4.324) (0.721)
OLS pooled
with
interaction
eﬀects
-6.577** -3.217** -9.424*** -0.932
(2.743) (1.523) (2.839) (0.771)
Note: dependent variable is the value of imports, by good, country and year
(or the log of imports in the case of the OLS regressions). Estimates control
for good*country and good*year fixed eﬀects. PPML estimates computed
using poi2hdfe. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, Table 10 shows the results of regressing the change in tariﬀs
between 1931 and 1933 on the change in imports between 1928 and 1931. As
can be seen, there is absolutely no correlation between these two variables.
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Table 9: Percentage of shift towards Empire, 1930-33, explained by trade
policy shift, using diﬀerent trade elasticity estimates
Econometric method PPML PPML with
interactions
OLS OLS with
interactions
Broad categories 70.0 69.8 64.9 68.8
Narrow categories 72.2 75.3 65.3 67.8
Table 10: Relationship between import changes, 1928-31 and tariﬀ changes,
1931-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Broad
category
All goods Agriculture Manufacturing Raw
materials
Colonial
goods
Log change in
imports,
1928-31
0.00783 -0.00538 -0.00179 0.00228 0.0132
(0.00524) (0.00357) (0.00240) (0.00243) (0.0346)
Constant 0.0841*** 0.0608*** 0.153*** 0.0345*** -0.133***
(0.00492) (0.00570) (0.00273) (0.00321) (0.0429)
Observations 1,225 147 611 357 110
R-squared 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.002
Note: dependent variable is the log change in tariﬀs, 1931-33
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